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3月23日,付明卫(中国社科院)
发布时间:2017-03-20   发布人:zs   点击数:512

报告人:付明卫,中国社科院

时间:323日,周四下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Financial Incentives and Physician Prescribing BehaviorEvidence from the Regulatory Change of Healthcare Price Structure in China

摘要:This paper empirically investigates how financial incentives affect physician prescribing behavior in an environment that physicians both prescribe and dispense medicine. Our identification strategy employs an exogenous policy shock which abolishes the 15% markup on drug sales and raises the visit fee by a large margin at the same time. Using a regression discontinuity design based on patient-visit-level data, we find that the policy shock leads to an 6.7% decrease in total expenditure per visit on average. Not only the abolishment of markup drives the decline in total expenditure, but also that the rise in the visit fee dampens physicians' over-prescription. Exactly, the variety of medicine prescribed by physician reduces by 0.15, and spending on examination and check decreases on the order of 13.3%. There exists heterogeneity in the effect of the shock among diseases.

报告人简介:付明卫,中国社科院经济研究所副研究员,北京大学经济学博士,美国宾州州立大学访问学者,从事健康经济学和新政治经济学方面的研究,在《经济研究》、《世界经济》和《金融研究》等刊物发表多篇论文。

 

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