您现在的位置:首页 >> 关闭
 
6月8日,翁翕(北京大学)
发布时间:2017-05-31   发布人:zs   点击数:1980

报告人:翁翕,北京大学

时间:6月8日,周四下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency

摘要:We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality and belong to one of two types, and majority type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting does a better job than majority voting in terms of long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations.

报告人简介:翁翕,现为北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系副教授。他目前主要研究领域为博弈论,应用微观经济理论和产业经济学。他本科、硕士均毕业于北京大学,博士毕业于美国宾夕法尼亚大学。他的研究成果发表或即将发表于国外顶级学术期刊,如Management Science, Journal of Economic Theory和International Economic Review. 他目前主持国家自然科学基金青年基金研究项目“地方官员更替、财政分权与区域经济发展”。翁博士曾获奖项有:2016中国信息经济学乌家培奖,2015台新金控最佳研究新人奖,2011 David Cass Memorial Prize in Economics, 2010 CES Gregory Chow Best Paper Awards.

 

 

 

扫一扫分享本页

 
相 关 新 闻:
热 点 新 闻: