您现在的位置:首页 >> 关闭
 
7月11日,Micro Theory Workshop
发布时间:2017-07-06   发布人:zs   点击数:1227

Micro Theory Workshop

11 July 2017, Beijing

School of International Trade and Economics

University of International Business and Economics

对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院

 

Venue: Room 1303, Boxue Building, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE).

Time11 July, 2017

会场:对外经济贸易大学博学楼1303

时间:2017年7月11日

1:30 - 3:00  Session I

Chair: Xiaoyong Cao (UIBE)

Speakers:

1.Yuan Ju (University of York, UK): The English Housing Market Mechanism

2.Yifei Sun (UIBE): Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima

3:30 - 5:00  Session II

Chair: Jianpei Li (UIBE)

Speakers:

1. Jin Zhang (UIBE): Optimal Liability in Markets for Expert Service

2. Paul Schweinzer (Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria): Dream Teams and the Apollo Effect

5:30- 8:30 Dinner and Discussion

 

Abstracts of Papers

1.The English Housing Market Mechanism

Authors: Yuan Ju, Zaifu Yang

Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Due to financial or locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.

2. Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima

Authors: Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong

Abstract: Recent developments in the literature reveal that Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, becomes a necessary condition for making implementation robust to a small amount of information perturbations. Motivated by this, we study Maskin's (1999) classical Nash implementation problem, but allow for the use of lottery and monetary transfer as in Abreu and Matsushima (AM, 1992, 1994). We therefore unify two well-established approaches of implementation theory. Specifically, we show that a social choice function is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Furthermore, we prove that a strengthened Maskin monotonicity fully characterizes rationalizable implementation. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms (with no integer or modulo game) are used; we take mixed strategies explicitly; no lottery or transfer can be used on the equilibrium path; two agents as well as more than two agents are handled; our mechanism is robust to information perturbations; and the message space is small. Our results also provide new insights on many classical as well as recent results in the literature.

3. Optimal Liability in Markets for Expert Service

Authors: Yongmin Chen, Jianpei Li, Jin Zhang

Abstract: We study the role of liability in disciplining an expert's behavior in a credence goods market. The expert, who provides two potential treatments for a consumer's problem, may misbehave in two possible ways: prescribing the “wrong” treatment given his private information, or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose the problem. Without liability, equal price margin for different treatments ensures honest treatment by the expert given his information, but fails to incentivize the expert to exert proper diagnosis effort. We show that when liability is imposed, if the equilibrium price margins for the two treatments are close enough—-are equal under zero liability—-the expert will choose the efficient treatment based on his information. Furthermore, a well-designed liability rule can be used to ensure both honest treatment and proper diagnosis effort. This efficiency result is robust if the diagnosis effort leads to a noisy but informative signal about the consumer's problem. When the signal is less informative, a pair of prices that elicits truthful reporting squeezes out the expert's information acquisition incentive and efficient outcome can not be achieved.
4.Dream teams and the Apollo effect

Authors: Alex Gershkov, Paul Schweinzer

Abstract: We model leadership selection, competition, and decision making in teams with heterogeneous membership composition. We show that if the choice of leadership in a team is imprecise or noisy—which may arguably be the case if appointment decisions are made by non-expert administrators—then it is not necessarily the case that the best individuals should be selected as team members. On the contrary, and in line with what has been called the “Apollo effect,” a “dream team” consisting of unambiguously higher-performing individuals may perform worse in terms of team output than a group composed of lower performers. We characterize the properties of the leadership selection and production processes that lead to the Apollo effect. Finally, we clarify when the opposite effect occurs in which supertalent performs better than comparatively less qualified groups.

 

扫一扫分享本页

 
相 关 新 闻:
热 点 新 闻: