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9月7日，张永超（上海财经大学） 
发布时间：20170901 发布人：zs 点击数：915 
报告人：张永超，上海财经大学 时间：9月7日，周四下午1:30—3:00 地点：博学楼1222教室 题目：Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice 摘要：We propose a new notion of weak stability for twosided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching–one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice problems and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students’ assignments. A matching is said to be selfconstrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any matching more stable than it. We prove that the following statements are equivalent for a matching: （i） it is weakly stable and selfconstrained efficient; （ii） it is exactly the outcome of the generalized Kesten's efficiencyadjusted deferred acceptance mechanism which uses its own set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint; and （iii） it weakly Pareto dominates every matching which is more stable than it. 报告人简介：张永超，上海财经大学经济学院副教授，新加坡国立大学数学博士，主要研究领域为数理经济学与博弈论。曾在 Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Theory, Economics Letters 等期刊发表文章。

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