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9月7日,张永超(上海财经大学)
发布时间:2017-09-01   发布人:zs   点击数:753

报告人:张永超,上海财经大学

时间:9月7日,周四下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice

摘要:We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching–one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice problems and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students’ assignments. A matching is said to be self-constrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any matching more stable than it. We prove that the following statements are equivalent for a matching: (i) it is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient; (ii) it is exactly the outcome of the generalized Kesten's efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism which uses its own set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint; and (iii) it weakly Pareto dominates every matching which is more stable than it.

报告人简介:张永超,上海财经大学经济学院副教授,新加坡国立大学数学博士,主要研究领域为数理经济学与博弈论。曾在 Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Theory, Economics Letters 等期刊发表文章。

 

 

 

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