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11月30日,李戎(中国人民大学财政金融学院)
发布时间:2017-11-21   发布人:zs   点击数:440

报告人:李戎, 中国人民大学财政金融学院

时间:11月30日,周四下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, Local Information, and the Stabilizing Role of Local Governments

摘要: Oates (1972) argues that local governments cannot use conventional policies to stabilize local economies due to fiscal spillovers and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. In contrast, Hayek's (1945) theory implies it is more efficient for an oversight government with a greater distance from the local markets to decentralize the policy rights to local governments who have better local knowledge. This paper tests empirically this conflict between theoretical implications. Our analysis reveals that local fiscal policies do have stabilizing effects, but vertical fiscal imbalances (VFIs) substantially weaken the stabilizing effect of local government automatic stabilizers and amplify the destabilizing effect of local discretionary fiscal policies. Lack of local information is found to be the key factor that results in this adverse effect of VFIs. Higher level governments' poorer availability of local information leads intergovernmental transfers to be more pro-cyclical, which prevents local stabilization policies from being effective. Hence, the empirical investigation favors the theoretical implication from Hayek (1945).

报告人简介:李戎,于2014年毕业于美国俄亥俄州立大学大学,获得经济学博士,现任中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授。研究领域为宏观经济学、财政与货币政策,其研究成果发表在European Economic Review, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis等多家国际一流学术期刊。

 

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