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12月14日,肖明军(武汉大学经管学院)
发布时间:2017-12-04   发布人:zs   点击数:501

报告人:肖明军,武汉大学经管学院

时间:12月14日,周四下午3:00—4:30

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Efficient Partnership Dissolution with Asymmetric Values

摘要: When partners have asymmetrically distributed values, efficient dissolution of partnership demands mechanisms to be belief-specific. This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism efficiently dissolving partnerships even if the designer or partners have wrong belief upon joint valuation distributions or upon partners' beliefs over underlying valuations, provided that these beliefs satisfy some regular conditions. The proposed mechanisms are (locally) robust to perturbations on beliefs and partnership shares. Moreover in the two-stage mechanism, n-2 partners have dominant strategy incentive compatibility to bid truthfully in the second stage and 2 partners have Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibility in the first stage. We also consider possible voting schemes to mitigate the effect of the binding interim individual rationality constraints.

报告人简介:肖明军,2015年毕业于斯坦福大学,获经济学博士学位,现为武汉大学经济与管理学院助理教授,研究领域为机制设计。

 

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