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12月21日,李志赟(杜伦大学商学院)
发布时间:2017-12-04   发布人:zs   点击数:283

报告人:李志赟,杜伦大学商学院

时间:12月21日,周四下午3:30—5:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline

摘要:A seller needs to allocate an indivisible good among a number of potential bidders by a deadline, and she needs to pay a positive search cost to contact a bidder.  This problem is quite general in many practical situations, such as in merger and acquisitions, academic recruitments, sequential contests, among others.

We investigate the optimal mechanism for this problem, and show that its outcomes are implementable by a sequence of second-price auctions.  The optimal search auction is characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensity over time, and this result is robust in both cases of long-lived and short-lived bidders.  When bidders are long-lived, the optimal reserve prices demonstrate a one-step-ahead property, and our results on this provide an important generalization of the well-known result in pure sequential search problems (Weitzman, 1979).  We further consider efficient search mechanism, and show that the efficient mechanism is characterized by lower reserve prices and higher search intensity than the optimal mechanism.

报告人简介:李志赟,2012年毕业于英国牛津大学,获经济学博士学位,现为英国杜伦大学商学院助理教授。研究领域为应用微观理论,目前的研究关注information disclosure in auctions 和sequential search in auction contexts。论文发表在Journal of Comparative Economics等学术期刊,并有论文正在Journal of Economic Theory上修改。

 

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