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5月17日，吴泽南（北京大学经济学院） 
发布时间：20180503 发布人：zs 点击数：395 
报告人：吴泽南，北京大学经济学院 时间：5月17日，周四下午1:30—3:00 地点：博学楼1222教室 题目：Feedback and Favoritism in Sequential Elimination Contests 摘要：This paper studies the optimal design of sequentialelimination contests. The contest proceeds in two stages, with N contestants participating in the first stage and M < N of them surviving the elimination and competing for the actual prize in the finale. We explore the optimal feedback policy for the contest, i.e., whether the contest designer should publicize contestants’ interim ranking prior to the finale. We show that the optimum depends on the objective function for contest design. The contest designer prefers opacity—i.e., concealing the information—if she aims to maximize total effort in the contest. However, transparency—i.e., publicizing contestants’ interim ranking—may outperform if the designer maximizes the expected winner’s total effort along the hierarchical ladder. We further consider an extended model in which the designer can place different weights on finalists’ effort entries in the contest success function based on their interim ranks. The baseline model is thus a special case of the extended one, because outright elimination is equivalent to placing excessively small weights on bottomranked contestants. We show that with endogenously chosen biases, opacity outperforms in generating total effort, while transparency emerges as the optimum when the expected winner’s total effort is at stake. These results also yield ample practical implications. 报告人简介：吴泽南博士，北京大学经济学院助理教授。2015年毕业于美国宾夕法尼亚大学，获得经济学博士学位。研究领域为应用微观理论，产业组织理论以及保险市场。研究成果在Rand Journal of Economics，Journal of Economics and Management Strategy，Economics Letters等期刊上发表。

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