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5月29日,郑捷(清华大学经济与管理学院)
发布时间:2018-05-16   发布人:zs   点击数:253

报告人:郑捷,清华大学经济与管理学院

时间:5月29日(周二)下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1007教室

题目: Information Design in All-pay Auction Contests

摘要:We study the information design problem of the contest designer in a simultaneous 2-player 2-type all-pay auction contest environment, where players have limited information about own/others valuation of the prize. We allow the players' ex ante symmetric, type distributions to be correlated, and the information disclosure policy to take the stochastic approach of Bayesian persuasion, which is a generalization of the traditional information disclosure policy. The optimal design, the structure of which depends on the degree of the correlation of players' types, is completed characterized and is shown to work better than the type-dependent information disclosure policy. This is the first study on full characterization of information design for games with two-sided asymmetric information and infinite action space.

报告人简介:郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授,清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编辑(Associate Editor),Research in Economics副编辑(Associate Editor)。2003年获得清华大学经济学学士学位,2005年获得清华大学经济学硕士学位,2007年获得美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士学位,2011年获得华盛顿大学经济学博士学位。研究领域包括经济理论、信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Experimental Economics等国际期刊,且有部分工作被收录入Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology。

 

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