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5月31日,杜创(中国社会科学院经济研究所)
发布时间:2018-05-21   发布人:zs   点击数:278

报告人:杜创,中国社会科学院经济研究所研究员

时间:5月31日(周四)下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, and the Optimal Degree of Competition

摘要:The relationship between competition and reputation are confusing. Competition facilitates firms in building a reputation for high-quality products because consumers have more choices and thus could punish firms more credibly; fierce competition, however, reduces firms’ incentive to maintain the reputation because firms’ profit margins shrink. Which is the main effect? What affects the relative size of the two effects? Such questions are not only theoretically important but also policy relevant. This article aims to study how the degree of competition (the number of firms) affects firms’ incentive to provide high-quality products in experience goods markets. Consumers observe only an imperfect signal of product quality after consumption and therefore face the moral hazard of firms. In the framework of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, we find a formula to determine the optimal degree of competition for reputational incentives.

报告人简介:杜创,中国社会科学院经济研究所研究员,微观经济学研究室副主任,中国社会科学院公共政策研究中心副主任,主要研究领域包括产业组织理论、网络经济、卫生经济学与医改等。

 

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