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6月14日,Ting Liu(Stony Brook University)
发布时间:2018-06-05   发布人:zs   点击数:380

报告人:Ting Liu,Stony Brook University

时间:6月14日(周四)下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1007教室

题目: Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets

摘要:We study trust building in credence goods markets in a dynamic setting. An extreme lemon problem arises in the one-shot game and results in no trade. In the repeated game, an expertís honesty is monitored through consumersírejection of his recommendations. We characterize the most proÖtable equilibrium for any discount factor. The expertís maximal proÖt weakly increases in the discount factor but cannot achieve the Örst best because the most proÖtable equilibrium either involves insu¢ cient treatment for the serious problem or excessive treatment for the minor problem. The monitoring technology and the equilibrium outcome contrast sharply with their counterparts for experience goods markets. Competition enhances e¢ ciency by allowing consumers to use second opinions to monitor expert honesty more cost e§ectively, but the e¢ ciency gain comes at the cost of less honesty.

报告人简介:Professor LIU Ting (Stony Brook University) conducts research in Industrial Organization, Health Economics, and Applied Microeconomic Theory. Her recent research interests include reputation building in expert markets, durable goods product design, and the impact of electronic medical record on physicians’ behavior.  Prior to joining Stony Brook, she worked as an Assistant Professor at Michigan State University. Her work has appeared in International Economic Review, European Economic Review, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, etc.

 

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