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5月30日,陆卓然(复旦大学)
发布时间:2019-05-20   发布人:zs   点击数:339

报告人:陆卓然,复旦大学

时间:2019年5月30日(周四)13:30-15:00

地点:博学楼1227

Title: Competitive Nonlinear Pricing for Signals

Abstract: This paper studies nonlinear pricing for horizontally differentiated products that create signaling value for consumers, who choose how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. We characterize the optimal symmetric price schedules under different market structures. Under monopoly, when receivers observe the price schedule, the market is partially covered, and quantity is downward distorted if there is slight horizontal differentiation. As the degree of horizontal differentiation rises, the market coverage rises, and the downward distortion decreases. When the degree is sufficiently high, at a certain level of signaling intensity, the monopolistic allocation may even achieve the first-best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price schedule, the market is always partially covered, and the allocation is more dispersed than that in the observed case. Specifically, higher types purchase more than in the observed case, with the highest types purchasing more than the first-best, whereas lower types purchase less than in the observed case, with more types excluded from the market. When the market structure changes from monopoly to duopoly, market competition results in a higher market coverage and larger quantities for both the observed and unobserved case.

报告人简介:Professor Lu Zhuoran obtained his Ph.D. in Economics in UCLA in 2018. He is now an assistant professor at School of Management, Fudan University. His research interest includes game theory, industrial organization, and microeconomic Theory. He has been working on "Selling Signals”, “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing for Signals”, “Optimal Sequence for Teamwork”, etc.

 

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