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12月12日,郑捷(清华大学经济管理学院经济系)
发布时间:2019-12-05   发布人:zs   点击数:7292

报告人:郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系

时间:2019年12月12日(周四)下午13:30-3:00

地点:博学楼1222

报告题目: Information Design in Simultaneous All-pay Auction Contests

摘要:We study the information design problem of the contest organizer in a simultaneous 2-player 2-type all-pay auction contest environment, where players have limited information about own/others valuations of the prize. The contest organizer can send a public message to the contestants about their type distribution, in order to maximize expected total effort. We allow the players' ex-ante symmetric type distributions to be correlated, and the information disclosure policy to take the stochastic approach of Bayesian persuasion. The optimal design, the structure of which depends on the degree of the correlation of players' types, is completely characterized and shown to achieve higher effort than the traditional discrete type-dependent information disclosure policy. Given players' types are private information, if there is a strong positive correlation, an optimal design consists of two posteriors with one representing a perfect positive correlation and the other representing a positive correlation identified by a cutoff condition; if there is a weak positive correlation or negative correlation between types, the optimal design consists of two posteriors with one where both being high types is impossible and the other where a positive correlation is identified by the same cutoff condition. We also consider the case in which types are unknown to both players and the case in which the type information is asymmetric between the two players. Welfare comparisons are also conducted across different informational setups. Our work is the first study on full characterization of information design for games with two-sided asymmetric information and infinite action space.

报告人简介:郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授,清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编,Research in Economics副主编,Journal of Asian Economics 执行编辑,North American Journal of Economics and Finance客座主编。2003年获得清华大学经济学学士学位,2005年获得清华大学经济学硕士学位,2007年获得美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士学位,2011年获得华盛顿大学经济学博士学位。研究领域主要包括经济理论、信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学,研究主题主要涉及参照依赖、自我控制、竞争合作等行为问题和机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题。先后主持多项国家自然科学基金项目,发表国际论文二十多篇。研究工作发表于Management Science、Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Experimental Economics等国际期刊,且有部分工作被收录入Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology,学术成果被中国信息经济学会授予"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖",2016-2018连续三年获"中国信息经济学青年创新奖"。

个人学术网页:https://jzheng.weebly.com

 

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