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9月16日,汪浩(北京大学国家发展研究院)
发布时间:2021-09-08   发布人:zs   点击数:267

 

报告人:汪浩(北京大学国家发展研究院)

时间:2021年9月16日(周四)下午1:30-3:00

地点:博学楼1222

主持人:李建培(国际经济贸易学院经济学系教授)

报告题目:N-Player War of Attrition with Complete Information

摘要:This paper considers a non-degenerate war of attrition in which N>2 heterogeneous player compete for N-k prizes. The equilibrium mixed strategies feature exponential distributions. Except in two-player case, such an equilibrium may not exist. But as long as it exists, the weaker players play the game more patiently than the others, and therefore are more likely to win. All players, including the strong ones, obtain zero expected payoffs. Under mild condition, the non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium is unique when it exists. When k>1, i.e., more than one players must concede before the game ends, k-1 of the players concedes at the very beginning of the game. The model can be extended to the cases when the winners’ payoffs depend on which players concede, and that when the players face the risks of “defeat.”

报告人简介:汪浩,北京大学国家发展研究院经济学教授。于美国俄亥俄州立大学经济系师从 James Peck 教授,获经济学博士学位。现任《经济学(季刊)》副主编,目前主要研究方向是产业组织理论、企业战略、反垄断与政府规制。

报告人主页:http://scholar.pku.edu.cn/hwang/home

 

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