时间：2021年10月28日（周四）下午1:30-3:00

地点：博学楼1007

主持人：孙一飞（国际经济贸易学院经济学系）

讲座题目：Moral hazard in networks

讲座摘要：In a multi-agent contracting setting, agents' performances are related due to both correlated noise and effort spillovers. We study the optimal linear contract when agents are risk averse. Imposing compensation weights on peer performance helps to filter out common noise, which relaxes the participation constraint （hedge effect）. However, it may also reduce the incentive to exert effort due to effort spillovers, which therefore tightens the incentive compatibility constraint （incentive effect）. We show that the optimal compensation sensitivity is determined by the dot product between the pure hedge vector and spillover vector. Furthermore, we propose an index called informativeness along the spillover direction to capture the balance between the hedge and incentive effects. As a result, both the effort and profit induced in equilibrium are positively related to this index. Finally, we demonstrate the disparity between spillover depth （measuring the strength of the spillover effect） and spillover width （summarizing the density of spillover structure）.

讲座人简介：孙阳，西南财经大学讲师，研究方向为博弈论、网络经济学。研究成果发表于Economic Theory, Economic Modelling, 另有工作论文在JET、GEB处于修订状态。

讲座人主页：https://ccbef.swufe.edu.cn/info/1129/1585.htm