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12月2日，孙君泽（武汉大学）
发布时间：2024-11-25 发布人：bl 点击数：426
12月2日，孙君泽（武汉大学）
2024年12月2日（周一）13:30-15:00 孙君泽（武汉大学）
讲座系列：产业组织理论与政策系列讲座第26场（学科发展系列讲座总期第76场）
讲座人： 孙君泽（武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员）
时间：2024年12月2日（周一）13:30-15:00
地点：博学楼1222
主持人：赵昕（对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院经济学系副教授）
讲座题目：On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
讲座摘要：We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where each sender's payoff depend only on the receiver's posterior expectation about a uni-dimensional state. Our main result provides a partial geometric characterization for equilibrium outcomes that are minimally informative. Building on this, we establish the sufficient and necessary condition for senders' competition to induce full information disclosure in all equilibria. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly — i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type — induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure a receiver to be strictly better off by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting any single sender.
主讲人简介：
孙君泽，武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员，于2019年获得阿姆斯特丹大学（University of Amsterda）经济学博士学位。在加入武汉大学之前，他于欧洲大学学院（European University Inistitute）从事博士后研究。他的主要研究领域包含微观经济理论、信息经济学、政治经济学，以及行为和实验经济学。其研究成果已发表于Games and Economic Behavior和Journal of Public Economic Theory等期刊，并主持一项国家自然科学基金青年项目。
讲座系列：产业组织理论与政策系列讲座第26场（学科发展系列讲座总期第76场）
讲座人： 孙君泽（武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员）
时间：2024年12月2日（周一）13:30-15:00
地点：博学楼1222
主持人：赵昕（对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院经济学系副教授）
讲座题目：On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
讲座摘要：We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where each sender's payoff depend only on the receiver's posterior expectation about a uni-dimensional state. Our main result provides a partial geometric characterization for equilibrium outcomes that are minimally informative. Building on this, we establish the sufficient and necessary condition for senders' competition to induce full information disclosure in all equilibria. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly — i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type — induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure a receiver to be strictly better off by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting any single sender.
主讲人简介：
孙君泽，武汉大学经济与管理学院特聘副研究员，于2019年获得阿姆斯特丹大学（University of Amsterda）经济学博士学位。在加入武汉大学之前，他于欧洲大学学院（European University Inistitute）从事博士后研究。他的主要研究领域包含微观经济理论、信息经济学、政治经济学，以及行为和实验经济学。其研究成果已发表于Games and Economic Behavior和Journal of Public Economic Theory等期刊，并主持一项国家自然科学基金青年项目。
