报告人：李明，加拿大康考迪亚大学（Concordia University）

时间：2020年1月7日（周二）下午1:30-3:00

地点：博学楼1303

题目: Persuasion bias in science: An experiment on strategic sample selection

摘要：We experimentally test a game theoretical model of researcher-evaluation interaction a la Di Tillio, Ottaviani, and Sorensen （2017a）. Researcher may strategically manipulate sample selection using his private information in order to achieve favorable research outcomes and thereby obtain approval from Evaluator. Our experimental results confirm the theoretical predictions for Researcher’s behavior but find significant deviations from them about Evaluator’s behavior. However, comparative statics are mostly consistent with the theoretical predictions. In the welfare analysis, we find that Researcher always benefits from the possibility of manipulation, in contrast to the theoretical prediction that he sometimes is hurt by it. Consistent with theoretical predictions, Evaluator benefits from the possibility of Researcher’s manipulation when she leans towards approval or is approximately neutral but is hurt by that possibility when she leans against approval.

报告人简介: 李明，现任加拿大Concordia大学副教授。主要研究方向包括信息经济学与实验经济学。其英文主要研究成果发表于Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics.

报告人个人主页：https://mingliecon.wordpress.com/