2025年3月17日（周一）13:30-15:00 杨仁琨 （暨南大学）

讲座系列：产业组织理论与政策系列讲座第32场（学科发展系列讲座总期第83场）

讲座人：杨仁琨 （暨南大学）

时间：2025年3月17日（周一）13:30-15:00

地点：博学楼1220

主持人：赵昕（对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院经济学系副教授）

讲座题目：The Design of Quality Disclosure Policy and the Limits to Competition

讲座摘要：We study a two-dimensional information design problem in a duopoly with vertical differentiation. A third-party designer, literal or metaphorical, designs a public joint signal structure to reveal product quality before firms compete in prices.  The industry-optimal policy only reveals the quality ranking, which amplifies perceived differentiation, mitigates price competition, and yields socially optimal allocation. The consumer-optimal policy, to the contrary, intensifies competition by fully concealing the ranking. We further derive welfare-maximizing signal structures for arbitrary Pareto weights. Depending on the weight and the market coverage assumption, the optimal policy takes one of the following forms: ranking, no-ranking, full revelation, or a combination of full revelation with either ranking or no-ranking policies. 

主讲人简介：

杨仁琨，暨南大学经济学院助理教授，博士毕业于俄亥俄州立大学经济系。研究领域为微观经济理论，具体包括信息设计、机制设计与产业组织理论。主持国家自然科学基金一项。