您现在的位置:首页 >> 关闭
 
12月21日,乔雪(清华大学,HKBU)
发布时间:2017-12-14   发布人:zs   点击数:2525

报告人:乔雪,清华大学,HKBU

时间:12月21日,周四下午1:30—3:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

题目:On the Paradox of Mediocracy 

摘要:We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is privately known to the leader, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on the observations of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and the outcome of her action. The leader could behave excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. The manager decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benefits the organization. There exists a trade-off between the efficiency gain created by the leader's competence and the manager's incentive to supply effort. We show that there exists a nonmonotone relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the welfare of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benefit from a seemingly mediocre leader. We further study the role played by organizational transparency in the framework.

报告人简介:乔雪,就职于清华大学,HKBU。研究领域主要包括健康与经济发展,劳动力市场流动,政治经济学。在Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Asia Pacific Economy, Journal of Economics等国际英文期刊和《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《世界经济》、《南方经济》等国内中文期刊上发表论文。

 

扫一扫分享本页

 
相 关 新 闻:
热 点 新 闻: