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12月27日,李智(厦门大学)
发布时间:2018-12-19   发布人:zs   点击数:223

报告人:李智,厦门大学

时间:12月27日(周四)13:30-15:00

地点:博学楼1222教室

Title: Generalized serial cost sharing mechanisms for the provision of non-excludable threshold public goods: an experimental investigation

Abstract: Following Gailmard and Palfrey (J Pub E, 2005, GP thereafter), we introduce two uniform price mechanisms, the uniform price auction (UPA) mechanism to extend the direct serial cost sharing to non-excludable public goods, and the uniform price cap (UPC) mechanism to solve the inefficiency of serial cost sharing by a variation of residual serial cost sharing. Both cost sharing mechanisms are budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous, but are not strategy proof. We compare these two cost sharing rules with voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PR) and with no rebates (NR, or PPM) as in GP for the provision of non-excludable public goods under incomplete information. We characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the two new mechanisms and conduct laboratory experiments to compare the performance of the four mechanisms. We find that UPA induces significantly higher value revelations than all the other three and UPC generates significantly more efficient allocations than all the others. In both uniform price mechanisms, that an individual's payment is not affected by the declarations of valuation higher than their own contributes to the higher value revelation and more efficient allocations by reducing the equilibrium size and facilitating coordination toward more efficient equilibria. Our results are robust to group size.

报告人简介:李智,厦门大学经济学院财政系及王亚南经济学院助理教授。2015年获得美国华盛顿大学经济学博士,2015年秋季加盟厦门大学经济学科。主要研究领域为公共经济学、实验经济学、资源和环境经济学,目前着重研究阈值公共物品的提供机制及其在现实中的应用,包括国际气候合作、社区和局地公共服务的私人提供等,同时也在开展基于合作博弈的资源分配理论和实验研究。研究成果在国际刊物Journal of Public Economics发表。

 

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