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3月21日,谭国富(美国南加州大学)
发布时间:2019-03-13   发布人:zs   点击数:1116

报告人:谭国富,美国南加州大学

时间:2019年3月21日(周四)3:30-5:00PM

地点:博学楼1222教室

Title: Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm under Competition

Abstract: We provide a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. When the capacity of the rival firm is constrained, as compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use the nonlinear pricing to partially foreclose the rival and harm the buyer. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and an optimal mechanism in a virtual principal-agent model, we characterize the optimal nonlinear pricing.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314159

Note: In the seminar Professor Tan will provide an extended discussion and motivation based on anti-monopoly law and enforcement in China.

Bio: Professor Guofu TAN currently holds the position of Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on auction theory, industrial organization, competition and regulatory policies, and the Chinese economy. His most recent work is concerned with collusion, entry, investments and resale in auction markets; all-units discounts and other loyalty programs; competition in international telephone markets; Nash bargaining with log-convexity; platform competition and standardization; and economic analysis of competition policy and the implications for China. His research work has been published in such leading scholarly journals as the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, and Journal of Development Economics, as well as many others.

 

 

 

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