We investigate the role of sellers’ commitment power in discouraging consumer search. Theoretically, lack of commitment power transforms sellers’ search-deterring claims into cheap talk, eliminating sellers’ ability to deter search in some market environments. However, our experiments show buyers’ search decisions are significantly affected by sellers’ cheap talk. When future prices are not adjustable, sellers falsely claim exploding offers to deter search. When future prices are adjustable, sellers falsely claim low future prices to lure consumers to return after search and exploit these “captive” consumers with subsequent price hikes. A behavioral model with naive buyers explains our experimental findings.

本文研究卖家承诺的可信度在其阻止消费者搜寻时的作用。理论上，当卖家的承诺缺乏可信度时，其搜寻威慑策略会成为空谈，使得卖家在某些市场环境下失去阻止消费者搜寻的能力。但是，我们的实验发现消费者的搜寻决策会显著地受到卖家不可信的空谈的影响。具体地，当未来商品售价不能调整时，卖家们会通过虚假地宣称未来不再出售该商品以阻止消费者搜寻。当未来商品售价能够调整时，卖家们会通过虚假地宣称未来商品会以低价出售来吸引消费者在搜寻过后返回来同他们寻求交易，然后他们再提高价格剥削这些别无选择的消费者。我们建立了一个包含天真（非理性）消费者的行为经济学模型解释这些实验发现。