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4月22日,王韬 (首都经济贸易大学)
发布时间:2024-04-09   发布人:bl   点击数:2448
2024年4月22日(周一)13:30-15:00 王韬 (首都经济贸易大学)
讲座系列:产业组织理论与政策第18场(学科发展系列讲座总期第53场)
讲座人:王韬  (首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院副教授)
时间:2024年4月22日(周一)13:30-15:00
地点:博学楼1222
主持人:赵昕(对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院经济学系讲师)
讲座题目:Counterintelligence and Its Effects in Games with Conflict of Interest
讲座摘要:We consider the interaction between a Defender with private types and an Attacker. The Attacker benefits from taking an action that matches the Defender’s actual type, while the Defender prefers the opposite. Before taking action, the Attacker receives a noisy signal about the Defender’s type generated either from his own intelligence system or a counterintelligence system covertly designed by the Defender. The Attacker does not know which system generated the signal, but he knows the probability that it comes from the Defender’s counterintelligence system (the “infiltration rate”). We examine the Defender’s equilibrium design of counterintelligence information and how counterintelligence affects the Attacker’s action choice. We find that the infiltration rate plays a crucial role in equilibrium characterization, and increasing it may reduce the Defender’s payoff. Moreover, counterintelligence does not always benefit the Defender or harm the Attacker.
主讲人简介:
王韬,首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院副教授,博士毕业于纽约州立大学石溪分校。主要研究领域为博弈论、信息经济学、产业组织理论。部分研究成果已在《American Economic Journal: Microeconomics》,《Economic Theory》,《International Journal of Industrial Organization》等国际著名期刊发表,主持一项自然科学基金青年项目。
讲座人主页:
https://sites.google.com/site/taowangstonybrook/
 

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