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我院王韡副教授的合作论文在国际权威期刊Production and Operations Management正式发表
发布时间:2024-04-29   发布人:sxy   点击数:2064

国际经济贸易学院王韡副教授的合作论文Can an E-commerce Platform and its Third-Party Sellers Benefit From Each Other’s Market Entry?于2024年1月在国际权威期刊Production and Operations Management(UTD24顶尖期刊)正式发表。

文章链接:https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478231224913


论文摘要

E-commerce platforms have an informational advantage over their third-party sellers, leading to the common belief that a platform’s market entry would harm sellers with similar products. However, unlike traditional retail competition, the platform and its sellers have aligned incentives: the platform’s commission depends on the seller’s revenue, and sellers rely on the platform to strengthen their online presence. Hence, the platform has no incentive to enter the market to harm the seller’s revenue severely. This paper introduces a duopoly model where the seller is the "incumbent" and the platform is the "potential entrant". Our model captures two salient features: (a) the "reputation effect" that enables the platform to obtain a higher consumer valuation than the seller, and (b) the "spillover effect" that expands the market size when an additional entity (e.g., the platform) enters the market. Our equilibrium analysis debunks the prevailing belief about platform’s entry, showing that platform’s entry can enable both the platform and the seller to obtain a higher profit when the unit cost is sufficiently low and the spillover effect is sufficiently high. For robustness checks, we consider three different extensions: an alternative duopoly model with reversed roles where the platform is the incumbent and the seller is the potential entrant, a scenario with an endogenously determined spillover effect, and a simultaneous market entry/exit decision-making process. We find a consistent result across all three extensions that both seller and platform entries can mutually benefit under similar market conditions, fostering a symbiotic relationship.

 

研究背景和研究意义

平台自营是京东、亚马逊等电商平台的一个重要策略。电商平台相对于第三方卖家具有信息优势,因此通常认为平台自营会对第三方卖家带来不利影响。但是,由于平台的收益不仅来自于自营活动,还包括第三方卖家向平台支付的佣金,因此平台自营有可能有利于第三方卖家。本文构建了一个双头竞争模型,该模型包含了平台自营带来的声誉效应和溢出效应。模型的均衡分析表明,当单位成本足够小并且溢出效应足够大时,平台自营能够带来平台和第三方卖家的双赢局面。该理论发现在平台和第三方卖家不同的进入顺序以及不同的溢出效应下均成立。该研究成果对电商平台是否采取自营策略以及第三方卖家是否进入已经有自营的平台提供了管理策略建议。


作者介绍

王韡,对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授、博士生导师,华盛顿大学经济学博士,国际权威期刊PLOS ONE编委。主要从事发展经济学、产业经济学和宏观经济学的学术研究。在Journal of Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、Research Policy、《经济研究》等国内外顶尖学术期刊发表论文30余篇,部分论文被《新华文摘》和《中国社会科学文摘》等转载,获得中国留美经济学会邹志庄最佳论文奖等学术奖励,主持多项国家自科基金等国家级课题,研究成果得到中央领导批示,多篇政策报告被国务院、教育部采纳。

 
 

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