讲座时间：2024年9月9日（周一）13:30-15:00

讲座地点：博学楼1222

主持人：赵昕

讲座题目：Information Design with Costly State Verification

讲座摘要：We study a persuasion problem when the receiver has the ability to probabilistically verify the state at a cost. The sender wants to convince the receiver to accept a project, but the receiver is only willing to accept the project when the quality is above a threshold. The optimal disclosure policy balances between influencing the receiver's decisions to accept and to verify the quality. The optimal disclosure is deterministic and involves at most three messages, each consisting of an action recommendation and a verification recommendation. In the optimal disclosure, the action recommendation has a cutoff structure while the verification recommendation has a negative assortative structure. Specifically, the optimal disclosure recommends acceptance when the quality is above a threshold. When the quality is below this threshold, rejection without verification is recommended. Above this threshold, verification is not recommended when the quality lies in the middle range of the interval. The optimal disclosure reveals more information compared to the case where verification is exogenous.

主讲人简介：杨灵，2016年获得美国匹兹堡大学经济学博士学位。现任德国曼海姆大学经济系博士后研究员。研究领域为博弈论，主要研究方向包括政治经济学和信息设计。研究成果曾发表于Games and Economic Behavior和 Economics Letters。