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3月3日,施贤文 (多伦多大学)
发布时间:2025-02-26   发布人:bl   点击数:1401
2025年3月3日(周一)13:30-15:00 施贤文 (多伦多大学)

讲座系列:产业组织理论与政策系列讲座第29场(学科发展系列讲座总期第80场)

讲座人: 施贤文 (多伦多大学)

时间:2025年3月3日(周一)13:30-15:00

地点:博学楼1220

主持人:赵昕(对外经贸大学国际经济贸易学院经济学系副教授)

讲座题目:Strategic Sampling from Manipulable Data

讲座摘要:We consider a game played by a decision maker (she) and a data manipulator (he). The decision maker samples data sequentially to learn a binary state, either high or low, and decides when to stop and take an action to match the state. The data manipulator can manipulate the data that the decision maker samples from and prefers the high action independent of the state. Both sampling and manipulating are costly. We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. In equilibrium, the data manipulator alternates between fully manipulating the data until the decision maker stops sampling and not manipulating at all. The decision maker consistently performs worse compared to a scenario without manipulation, while the manipulator does not necessarily benefit from the manipulation. Additionally, under manipulation, the decision maker may prefer static sampling to sequential sampling, in sharp contrast to the superiority of sequential sampling in the absence of manipulation.

主讲人简介:
Xianwen Shi is a Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. He is an expert in mechanism design and information design, known for his work on mechanism design with endogenous information acquisition, with information disclosure, without transfers, or with limited commitment, as well as for his work on contest design. He has published papers on leading economics journals such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, and Review of Economic Studies. His current research focuses on information disclosure and manipulation in strategic dynamic contexts.  
 

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